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Trade and Development in an Era of 
Multipolarity and Reterritorialization 
By Chantal Thomas† 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay will consider two phenomena emergent within international 
trade law and policy: multipolarity (the emergence of new global powers 
alongside existing hegemons) and reterritorialization (the rise, sometimes in 
quite virulent form, of economic nationalism as a basis for asserting State 
controls over, and barriers to, cross-border trade). These new dynamics present 
serious challenges and dangers.1 This essay will consider whether they might 
also create opportunities for reshaping the international economic order to be 
more supportive of the longstanding concerns of developing States. In doing so, 
the essay will elucidate key aspects of both the global political economy and the 
international norms and institutions that have helped to shape it. 
At several points throughout the history of the current trading system, 
developing States have struggled to remake the economic order.2 Most notably 
 
 †  Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I wish to thank participants in the conference, “Trade 
Law in the Trump Era: A Transatlantic Perspective,” held September 2017 at Boston University at the 
invitation of Professor Daniela Caruso, and the workshop, “Rethinking Trade and Investment Law,” held 
at Harvard Law School in April 2018 with the Institute for Global Law and Policy, for rich discussions 
pertaining to many of the topics discussed here. Some themes addressed here are also taken up in the 
Editors’ Introduction to GLOBALIZATION REIMAGINED: TOWARDS A PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR WORLD 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (Alvaro Santos, Chantal Thomas & David Trubek eds., forthcoming 
2019). Errors are of course mine alone. 
 1. These are ably taken up in several other contributions to this Symposium. See Rachel 
Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of the WTO, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 6 (2019); 
Timothy Meyer, Trade, Redistribution, and the Imperial Presidency, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 16 
(2019); Joel Trachtman, A World Trade Organization for Workers?, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 28 
(2019); Gregory Shaffer, A Tragedy in the Making? The Decline of Law and the Return of Power in 
International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 37 (2019); Andrew Lang, Protectionism’s 
Many Faces, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 54 (2019). 
 2. Faizel Ismail, Mainstreaming Development in the World Trade Organization, 39 J. WORLD 
TRADE 11 (2005). For a history of developing State initiatives on international trade, including events that 
took place before the era of the New International Economic Order, such as the creation of a “Part IV” on 
Trade and Development in the GATT and the establishment of the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) for developing countries, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL 
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during the era of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), they 
sought to do this by crafting an alternate normative framework through the 
United Nations. This framework was christened by the General Assembly’s 1974 
resolution calling for “the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
[NIEO] based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest 
and cooperation among all States.”3 The NIEO articulated principles of active 
international redistribution and also supported greater economic sovereignty for 
developing States seeking to exercise domestic control in an order shaped by the 
Global North.4 
Much of this proposed international architecture in support of the strong 
developmental State5 crumbled in the 1980s. Developing States that had 
supported the NIEO lost much of their global political and economic leverage 
through a series of internal and external economic crises, paving the way for a 
revived and strengthened assertion of the imperative to open trade,6 as reflected 
by the GATT’s metamorphosis into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995. Only a few short years after the WTO’s creation, however, developing 
States regrouped to bring their concerns back to the negotiating table through the 
creation in 2001 of the Doha Development Agenda as a frame for further 
refinement of the trading system.7 Yet this effort, too, has fallen far short of its 
stated objectives. The concomitant rise of new bilateral, regional, and mega-
regional agreements simultaneously undermined some of the policy gains 
obtained through the Doha Development talks (such as constraints on patents to 
ensure access to medicines).8 Many of those new agreements contained “WTO-
 
SYSTEM (1987). 
 3. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order (May 1, 1974). 
 4. See SUNDYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (2011). 
 5. “The term developmental state refers to a state that intervenes and guides the direction and 
pace of economic development.” Esteban Pérez Caldentey, The Concept and Evolution of the 
Developmental State, INT’L J. POL. ECON., Fall 2008, at 27, 28. The term is attributed to Chalmers 
Johnson’s study of Japanese economic growth, CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 
(1982), and is sometimes used in a geographically specific way to describe the style of State-led economic 
growth particular to East Asia. See Ziya Öniş, The Logic of the Developmental State, 24 COMP. POL. 109 
(1991). Here, I adopt the broader sense of the term, referring generally to the approach to economic 
development that involves the State directly in a range of economic activity, from planning to financing 
to production and distribution. See, e.g., Sara Ghebremusse, Conceptualizing the Developmental State in 
Resource-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa, 8 L. & DEV. REV. 467 (2015). The developmental State sensibility is 
informed by a vast array of political, historical, and economic factors from the early period of 
decolonization forward to the present: in terms of the economic theory underlying it, the mid-twentieth 
century analyses of “big push” and “balanced growth” industrialization were formative. See Kevin M. 
Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Industrialization and the Big Push, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1003, 
1004 (1989). 
 6. For general discussions of the relationship between global political economy and reform in 
domestic and international regulation, see Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic 
Development in Theory and Practice: Towards an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2011). 
 7. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). The Agenda is named for the location of the 2001 WTO 
Ministerial Conference. 
 8. See, e.g., Ping Xiong, Patents in TRIPS-Plus Provisions and the Approaches to 
Interpretation of Free Trade Agreements and TRIPS: Do They Affect Public Health?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 
155 (2012). 
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plus” commitments that seemed redistributive to the Global North, as in the case 
of heightened protections for intellectual property holders and for private 
investors.9 
Over the same time period, the global economy saw both an unprecedented 
expansion of trade and a dramatic increase in global income inequality. The 
prediction that rich and poor States would “converge” toward an enhanced 
standard of living turned out to be complicated by fractures opening up within 
and between States as trade liberalization created economic “winners” and 
“losers” across the Global North and the Global South. Several of the larger 
developing States have achieved significant overall gains: in China alone, 
hundreds of millions of people have emerged from poverty. Yet other States have 
struggled with continued economic marginalization. For example, many of the 
less-developed States in sub-Saharan Africa, despite a period of boosted growth 
associated with a cycle of high commodity prices, did not see substantial gains 
in poverty reduction.10 
So what to make of the challenges facing the current trading order and their 
implications for developing States? The remainder of this essay will elaborate 
on the two dynamics introduced above in conjunction with these questions. 
I. MULTIPOLARITY 
Since the end of the Cold War, it has been widely recognized that the 
United States has played the role of global hegemon. It was no coincidence that 
the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War 
era was accompanied by an increased emphasis on liberal economic policy in the 
institutions of international economic law. Even before this, however, influence 
within the trading system was remarkably confined to a small club of 
economically powerful States. A number of terms that emerged in the lexicon of 
international trade law and policy evidence this exclusivity. The “Quad,” for 
example, referred to the four entities most often involved in GATT-era dispute 
settlement over extant rules and most often driving negotiations to establish new 
ones: Canada, the European Union (formerly the European Economic 
Community), Japan, and the United States. The “green room”—a process 
through which States conduct trade talks—evoked a small chamber for the 
powerful inner circle of Member States who could play an active role in trade 
rulemaking. 
With the emergence of the WTO, the United States achieved many of the 
objectives it had been pursuing. Most importantly, this included the 
establishment of an enhanced dispute settlement process with greater 
institutionalization and enforcement power.11 But the imprint of the United 
 
 9. While a central benefit of heightened investor protections ostensibly was to promote 
development in poor countries by encouraging increased foreign direct investment, substantial empirical 
literature has emerged to question that proposition. See, e.g., THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). 
 10. Kathleen Beegle et al., Poverty in a Rising Africa, WORLD BANK GROUP (2016), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22575/9781464807237.pdf. 
 11. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
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States was clear in other parts of the new organization as well, from the 
elaboration of rules on trade remedies12 to the incorporation of strong intellectual 
property protection.13 
However, in the two decades after the WTO’s establishment, the 
institutional and economic dominance of the United States and the Global North 
has begun to weaken.14 In the global economy, the “BRICS” States—Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa—have emerged as newly salient players. 
Some of these countries were able to convert economic clout into institutional 
influence in the WTO. Brazil and China, for example, became adept at advancing 
their interests through the formal dispute settlement process, scoring a number 
of important and highly visible victories. India exercised significant influence in 
the negotiation process, successfully leading the campaign to allow developing 
States to restrict imports in furtherance of food security objectives.15 In doing so, 
it overcame the objections of the United States and a number of other powerful 
agriculture-exporting States. 
Outside the WTO, the race to create new mega-regional trading blocs 
became rivalrous with negotiations taking place across different geographical 
areas. For example, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
Transnational Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) each featured the United 
States as a lead negotiating power. Simultaneously, trade talks conducted by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a proposed Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in which China would be the 
foremost economic power have excluded countries outside Asia. The U.S. 
withdrawal from the TPP and its repudiation of core commitments within the 
WTO have further highlighted these alternate spheres of economic influence. 
At the level of political economy, the new multipolarity is nowhere more 
evident than the role China plays in global trade. China produces industrial and 
manufactured goods and inputs and consumes raw materials and other exports at 
a level similar to the United States and Europe and much greater than any other 
market.16 Beyond trade, China occupies similar prominence as a source of capital 
 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
 12. The United States has played an early and consistent role in encouraging the development 
of multilateral rules on trade remedies. See 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 
(1986-1992) 1405, 1421, 1486, 1519, 1521 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). Relatedly, the United States 
was at the forefront of the development of multilateral rules on subsidies. See 1 THE GATT URUGUAY 
ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 816, 821-25 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). 
 13. See 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 12, at 2253-64. 
 14. For varied discussions of the significance of this point, see Pasha L. Hsieh, Rethinking the 
RCEP in the Third Regionalism: Paradigm Shifts in World Trade Law?, in GLOBALIZATION REIMAGINED, 
supra note 1; Poul F. Kjaer, The End of Trade and Investment Law as We Know It: From Singularity to 
Pluralism, in GLOBALIZATION REIMAGINED, supra note 1; Andrew Lang, Heterodox Market Orders in 
the Global Trade System, in GLOBALIZATION REIMAGINED, supra note 1; Sonia E. Rolland & David M. 
Trubek, Embedded Neoliberalism and Its Discontents: The Uncertain Future of Trade and Investment 
Law, in GLOBALIZATION REIMAGINED, supra note 1; Robert Wai, Beyond Normal Trade Law, in 
GLOBALIZATION REIMAGINED, supra note 1. 
 15. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY 298 (3d ed. 2015); see also General Council, Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes: 
Decision of 27 November 2014, WTO Doc. WT/L/939 (Nov. 27, 2014). 
 16. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., 2017 HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, at 23, 90, 94, 
96, U.N. Doc. TD/STAT.42, U.N. Sales No. E.17.II.D.7 (2017). 
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through development assistance and investment.17 The One Belt, One Road 
Initiative and the Chiang Mai Initiative provide two of the more visible 
examples. In sum, the world stage increasingly features not only the United 
States and its traditional North Atlantic allies, but also leading States from the 
developing world. 
This new multipolarity may create opportunities for developing States, not 
only to form new economic relationships, but also to establish a new dynamic in 
international economic law and policy. One of the repeated refrains from 
development specialists has been to increase “policy space” within international 
economic institutions—that is, to ensure that developing States have sufficient 
discretion to depart from a strictly open-market model to cultivate internal 
economic capacity.18 During the Cold War, some developing States were able to 
cross-leverage the rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs to generate 
strategic and material support for their own policies. A world of newfound 
political and economic rivalry between competing geographical blocs may again 
create policy space by preventing any one power from fully imposing its own 
template on weaker States. It is therefore possible that the new multipolar world 
might open the way for a “Non-Aligned Movement” of the twenty-first century. 
Additionally, to the extent that the new powers do have a policy template, 
it is arguably one that is more supportive of the developmental State than the 
framework of development policy established in the era of “globalization.” The 
globalization-era framework included wide-ranging substantive directives from 
conditionalities enforcing neoclassical “structural adjustment” reforms to 
institutional assessments represented in “good governance” metrics. In contrast, 
the BRICS States, for example, have established a “BRICS Bank” the stated 
objectives of which include the provision of alternative means of development 
assistance that reflects the stated concerns of developing country governments 
more closely than those of the traditional international financial institutions.19 
Before Brazil’s descent into economic and political instability after 2014, it 
seemed to exemplify a new standard for socially progressive development 
strategy.20 China has demonstrated little interest in the overall policy orientation 
of its trading partners, opting instead for a largely pragmatic posture.21 India, 
 
 17. See Ngaire Woods, Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent 
Revolution in Development Assistance, 84 INT’L AFF. 1205 (2008). 
 18. See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 9 (2007) (“[A] desirable trade regime would be one that 
provided much greater policy space to developing countries to pursue domestically crafted growth 
strategies, possibly including unorthodox policies . . . .”). 
 19. See Sixth BRICS Summit, Fortaleza Declaration (July 15, 2014), 
http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/press-releases/214-sixth-brics-summit-fortaleza-declaration. 
 20. David M. Trubek, Law, State, and the New Developmentalism: An Introduction, in LAW 
AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT 3, 
4 (David M. Trubek et al. eds., 2013) (“In this ‘new developmental state’ approach, the government plays 
an active role in mobilizing resources, stimulating investment, and promoting innovation. It employs 
open-economy industrial policy to restructure industry and increase international competitiveness. It uses 
an active social policy to eliminate poverty, reduce inequality, and stimulate domestic demand. Unlike 
the developmental state of the 1950s to the 1980s, the new developmental state seeks to benefit from 
participation in the global economy while avoiding the dangers of free-trade fundamentalism.”). 
 21. This phenomenon has been analyzed, for example, in Xiaojun Li, China is Offering “No 
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though active in adopting liberalizing reforms in the 1990s, has also more 
robustly embraced economic nationalism.22 
Of course, the verdict is still out on whether the new developing powers 
will demonstrate greater solidarity for smaller economies than have their 
predecessors in the Global North. China, for example, may be a less ideologically 
oriented presence than Europe or the United States,23 but it may nevertheless 
pursue its own perceived economic interests.24 Relatedly, smaller economies 
may continue to experience marginalization in the global political economy, 
whether at the hands of traditional or emerging powers. For example, African 
governments that expressed concern about being excluded from the West-
centered mega-regionals such as TPP and TTIP are also excluded from the East-
centered mega-regionals such as RCEP. Moreover, the ability of many of the 
smaller developing economies to pursue a conventional path of industrialization 
through manufacturing has been compromised in part by the inability to cost-
compete with larger developing economies. 
There is also the increasing reality that the adjective “developing” no 
longer describes—if it ever did—a set of relatively typical characteristics across 
the Global South. Developing States are highly segmented and differentiated. 
One need only look at the plethora of diverse negotiating blocs within WTO 
negotiations to realize this. Some groups represent a shared historical 
background, such as the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) States, most of 
which were at one time subjected to European colonialism. But many also 
occupy a variety of different positions on key law and policy issues in the talks. 
On the central issue of agricultural trade policy in the Doha negotiations, 
for example, developing States that primarily export agricultural products (such 
as Brazil) have supported increasing market access and liberalizing remaining 
trade barriers.25 Other countries, such as India, which are more focused on their 
large internal markets, have sought to reinforce their ability to depart from trade 
disciplines where necessary to protect domestic interests such as food security.26 
Still others, which depend on imports for food staples, stand to be adversely 
affected by, for example, India’s redirection of staple crops to its own domestic 
market; these States want talks not only to secure market access for their export 
 
Strings Attached Aid’ to Africa. Here’s What That Means., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/27/china-is-offering-no-strings-
attached-aid-to-africa-heres-what-that-means. 
 22. See, e.g., Surajit Mazumdar, Big Business and Economic Nationalism in India, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN ASIA 59 (Anthony P. D’Costa ed., 2012). 
 23. Perhaps the most classic expression of this is the quote attributed to Deng Xiaoping, who is 
credited for leading the economic transformation of China: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so 
long as it catches mice.” GEORGE C.S. LIN, RED CAPITALISM IN SOUTH CHINA 46 (1997). 
 24. See, e.g., Yun Sun, China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?, BROOKINGS (Feb. 7, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah (arguing that one objective 
behind China’s investments in Africa is to secure natural resources). 
 25. See Celso Lafer, Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil, Statement at the Fourth Session of 
the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (Nov. 10, 2001), WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/ST/12, at 2 (“The new mandate for agriculture that we establish here must clearly aim at 
the elimination of distorting trade practices.”). 
 26. SACHIN KUMAR SHARMA, THE WTO AND FOOD SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10 (2016). 
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commodities, which provides needed hard currency, but also to focus on securing 
development assistance to assuage costs of external food dependence.27 
In sum, emerging economic and institutional multipolarity creates some 
benefits but also presents some potential pitfalls for developing States. It may 
offer more sources for economic growth, and result in a greater degree of 
domestic policy autonomy. However, at the same time it may further entrench 
the divergence between the newly industrializing economies and other States in 
the developing world and may even crowd out those smaller economies from 
traditional pathways to growth. 
II. RETERRITORIALIZATION 
Alongside the rise of multipolarity in international relations, the current 
order has pivoted towards economic nationalism as a basis for shaping trade 
policy. Perhaps most visibly, the United Kingdom has elected to withdraw from 
the European Union while the Trump administration has rejected or renegotiated 
its existing trade commitments, such as the TPP, the WTO, and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Yet these developments in the United Kingdom and the United States are 
only indicators of what is now a global revival of nationalism. This revival is by 
no means limited to the North Atlantic countries that were the primary architects 
of the international economic order. Well before Trump or Brexit, the 
government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India consolidated its power by 
embracing nationalist economic policies28 and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán endorsed the construction of an “illiberal state.”29 After the twin shocks 
to the international status quo of President Trump’s election and Brexit in 2016, 
numerous countries have entrusted conservative nationalists with power: witness 
the 2018 election of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and significant right-wing 
parliamentary minorities in Sweden and Germany. 
In some ways, the aggressive return of the nation-state, like the rise of 
multipolarity, may wind up providing additional ballast for the “policy space” so 
dearly sought by many developing States. After all, in the NIEO days it was the 
developing world that emphasized robust notions of economic sovereignty.30 
Now that demands for economic sovereignty are also coming from the Global 
North, there is arguably less political risk for developing States to pursue policies 
such as South Africa’s 2015 withdrawal from its bilateral investment treaties. 
This retreat from investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) stands out much less, 
and is less likely to give rise to backlash against a perceived repudiation of global 
 
 27. For a general overview of diverse concerns of developing countries in the WTO agriculture 
negotiations, see Understanding the WTO: The Agreements – Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2018). 
 28. See Ian Hall, Is a ‘Modi Doctrine’ Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?, 69 AUSTL. J. INT’L 
AFF. 247 (2015). 
 29. Honor Mahony, Orban Wants to Build “Illiberal State,” EUOBSERVER (July 28, 2014), 
https://euobserver.com/political/125128 (discussing recent public address by Orban). 
 30. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Dec. 
17, 1973). 
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economic protocols, now that the Global North has also shifted away from ISDS. 
Other examples of this trend include: the United States-led renegotiation of 
NAFTA; the replacement of ISDS with an “Investment Court System” in the 
2017 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the 
European Union; and the recently adopted or discussed reforms to the procedural 
rules of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) and the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).31 
While the formal devolution of power back to States may expand policy 
space for developing countries, it may also increase their economic precarity. 
Much of the argument in GATT and WTO law and policy for special and 
differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries through, for example, the 
establishment of special access to markets in developed States rested on a 
principle of international engagement and shared responsibility for global 
economic equity.32 Support for SDT market access and even MFN33 market 
access is now dissipating in the midst of the proliferation of preferential trade 
agreements. Concurrently, countries like the United States resort to fortifying 
their trade barriers through a number of legal strategies, ranging from the 
deployment of national security policy34 to the increased use of trade remedies.35 
In the face of these changes, small economies whose internal capacity continues 
to be insufficient to drive significant growth will of course be further challenged. 
Moreover, the strong developmental State always posed potential concerns 
for questions of domestic economic distribution and equality. In many instances, 
classic developmentalist policy arguably legitimated States in sacrificing the 
health and wellbeing of current populations in the name of future 
industrialization, through lethal indifference or opposition to labor rights, 
 
 31. For further discussion of these developments and related debates, see Sergio Puig & Gregory 
Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 361 (2018); Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State 
Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410 (2018). 
 32. See, e.g., T. Ademola Oyejide, Special and Differential Treatment, in DEVELOPMENT, 
TRADE AND THE WTO 504 (Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo & Philip English eds., 2002). This market 
access system, the GSP, calls for preferential and non-reciprocal access for developing countries. See 
Decision, Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, ¶ 2(a), n. 3, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT BISD (26th Supp.), at 203 (1980). 
 33. The principle of most-favored nation treatment (MFN) obligates WTO Member States to 
accord equal trade treatment to each other (unless exceptions, such as those for SDT, apply). General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 34. GATT Article XXI exempts from otherwise applicable trade disciplines certain kinds of 
measures taken in furtherance of a member State’s “essential security interests.” Id. art. XXI. The United 
States has imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, which it claims are necessary to protect national 
security. Proclamation No. 9,704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 8, 2018); Proclamation No. 9,705, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018). 
 35. The rise in the application of antidumping and countervailing duties has been acknowledged, 
with concern, in communications by the WTO and also, with approval, by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce within the Trump administration. See, e.g., WTO Members Exchange Views on Rise in Anti-
Dumping Actions (Apr. 27, 2017), WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news17_e/anti_10may17_e.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/02/us-department-commerce-initiates-
antidumping-duty-and-countervailing (“‘With an 81 percent increase in trade cases initiated since 
President Trump took office, this Administration has made it clear that we will vigorously administer 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws,’ said Secretary [of Commerce Wilbur] Ross.”). 
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environmental fallout, and other forms of social policy.36 The “strong State” 
posture may obscure the ability of alternate internal voices to organize for 
improved conditions for themselves by appealing to their governments’ 
international commitments.37 
CONCLUSION 
Such questions of responsibility for global justice and equality have been 
fraught through the entire lifespan of international economic institutions, as those 
institutions have permutated through one or another set of legal and policy 
orientations. The world trading order is now confronting perhaps the clearest 
existential crisis it has faced since the establishment of the GATT just after 
World War II. That the threat to the GATT’s successor institution, the WTO, 
stems most directly from the actions of the United States under the Trump 
administration represents a most surprising turn of events, since the United States 
was far and away the most influential in its creation. A central function of the 
trading system, established as it was in a world newly emerging from global war, 
has been not only to create economic prosperity, but also to help secure 
international peace and stability by reducing the ability of States to channel 
political hostilities through trade policy. Consequently, the full implications of 
this moment of uncertainty for the multilateral trade regime remain unknown. It 
remains to be seen whether, and in what form, legal and institutional obligations 
towards international cooperation to achieve global equity, in the form of 
economic development, will survive this brave new world order. 
 
 36. A globally reported example of lethal labor conditions was the 2013 building collapse in 
Rana Plaza, a garment manufacturing hub outside Dhaka, Bangladesh, that killed 1,134 workers. For a 
discussion of the respective roles of the Bangladeshi government, multinational corporations, and global 
consumer demand, see Jason Burke, Rana Plaza: One Year on From the Bangladesh Factory Disaster, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/19/rana-plaza-
bangladesh-one-year-on. 
 37. Such appeals are by no means always successful. For example, a high-profile joint effort of 
U.S. and Guatemalan labor movements to enforce labor standards in Guatemala through the Labor 
Chapter of the U.S. trade agreement with Central America (CAFTA-DR) ultimately failed. For a highly 
critical discussion, see Ciaran Cross, Failure by Design: Did the U.S. Choose to Lose the Guatemala 
Labour Dispute?, 24 INT’L UNION RTS., no. 3, 2017, at 23. 
